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ADAPTING THE ERW COMMUNITY 
TO COMBAT IED THREATS 
by Brad Alford and Michael Kennedy [ Janus Global Operations, LLC. ]
FEATURE
I
n Iraq and other regions soon to be liberated from the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), recovery and 
stability efforts are hindered by improvised explosive 
devices (IED), which threaten civilians returning home and/
or assisting with reconstruction. According to Relief Web, 
the Anbar Provincial Council “discourage[d] the premature 
return of internally displaced persons (IDP) to Fallujah due 
to the remaining IEDs left behind by the Islamic state of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS) militants.”1 This threat, coupled with the 
consequences of an asymmetrical conflict, has changed the 
operating environments encountered by organizations that 
respond to explosive remnants of war (ERW). In order for 
post-conflict explosive hazard search and removal activities to 
stabilize these areas, organizations must be prepared to adapt 
to the dynamic and challenging environments that are associ-
ated with improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD). 
With origins seated in specialized military and police counter- 
terrorist explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, IEDD incor-
porates experience from a wide spectrum of conflicts and forms 
a distinctive branch of the wider EOD discipline. The practice is 
often difficult and costly as it requires specialized equipment and 
advanced training. The difficulty and ambiguity of the IEDD 
tasks, along with the potential catastrophic consequences of 
accidental detonations, have long made it an exclusive activity 
for military or special police units. In recent years, the prev-
alence of the IED threat has resulted in IED awareness and 
search skills training to the vast majority of personnel deployed 
in conflict operations. Since an IED is considered a weapon 
from combatants, organizations that conduct IEDD are faced 
with similar security challenges as militaries and local police. 
This integrated understanding of explosive hazards and their 
operational impacts has reached ERW removal organizations. 
This prompts the question: how can existing mine action orga-
nizations and personnel adapt to address this threat and effec-
tively support stability operations?
DISTINGUISHING MINE ACTION FROM IEDD
ERW removal and mine action organizations have a wealth 
of experience operating in post-conflict areas to remove 
explosive hazards. Some organizations have categorized IEDs 
as a type of improvised landmine in order to catalogue and 
address it within the confines of their scope and mandates. 
However, IEDs can vary greatly, even in the same opera-
tional theater. This variation can be in the form of a simple 
pipe bomb used by ISIL as a hand grenade to a multi-switched 
device incorporating multiple main charges. 
The battlefields of the 20th century were often open areas, 
fought between traditional force-on-force opponents using 
conventional ordnance, which included mines that were 
placed as both barrier obstacles, as well as nuisance mine-
fields, targeting vulnerable points such as bridge abutments 
or landing strips. The vast majority of these mines were non-
electrical and recognized and approved render safe pro-
cedures (RSP). They were often placed in areas that could 
withstand a high order detonation, if demolition in situ was 
required. Due to the materials and methodology used in the 
creation of these devices, historical means of recognition and 
IED charge fitted for anti-lift. 
All photos courtesy of Janus Global Operations.
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the ability to reference technical publications to determine a 
suitable RSP are less valuable. Not only have the means of dis-
posal changed, but search procedures can differ when work-
ing with IEDs. For example, a road that might have a crush 
wire IED will likely have a switch, which is difficult to detect 
with traditional demining procedures unless search teams 
are equipped with the training and equipment specific to IED 
threats. These factors reduce the suitability for a traditional 
demining approach and require the adaptation of new train-
ing and procedures, which are principally taken from recent 
military experience.
ISIL and groups like the Taliban are now aware that non-
military actors will be used to search and clear areas after 
they were forced to withdraw. It serves their interest to make 
clearance organizations’ tasks difficult. It is critical that orga-
nizations understand that IEDs in liberated areas are still 
serving ISIL’s purpose of harassing and restricting movement 
through death or injury. Incorrectly categorizing all IEDs in 
liberated areas as abandoned or legacy devices or as simple 
conventional mines creates further risk to life and property. 
When ISIL places IEDs in houses, schools, government build-
ings, and other critical infrastructure points, they are actively 
targeting the credibility of the local authority. The inability 
to dispose of these IEDs can adversely affect the confidence 
that the local populace has in said authority. This can lead to 
discontent, which can devolve into further violence. This has 
proven to be an effective Taliban tactic, technique, and pro-
cedure (TTP) against the government of Afghanistan. The 
Taliban has utilized IEDs to actively disrupt the government’s 
ability to provide the fundamental services required to affirm 
its authority.
Traditionally, most community-based ERW removal orga-
nizations were considered noncombatants. Community-
based mine action organizations in Afghanistan remove 
devices left behind from previous wars. The Taliban and ISIL 
view IEDs as weapons, and disposing of these 
weapons causes insurgents to react with hos-
tility and see mine action organizations as 
combatants. In Afghanistan, mine action orga-
nizations are advised to never destroy IEDs 
and instead report them to local authorities 
to avoid violent reactions from the Taliban. 
Organizations that are conducting IEDD oper-
ations must adapt to this important risk and 
provide the proper security and risk manage-
ment from being targeted by insurgent groups. 
LEARNING FROM EOD EXPERIENCE
Organizations involved in post-conflict ERW removal can 
benefit from the experience of  IEDD operators in approach-
ing these items with philosophies and principals specific to 
IEDs as opposed to mines. Traditional unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) clearance operations relied heavily on technical publi-
cations of recognized RSPs for specific conventional ordnance 
and military booby trap switches. Since each encountered IED 
can vary greatly in terms of materials and deployment, the 
traditional ERW RSPs counter the nature of the improvised 
threat. Militaries adapted to this by adopting a philosophy of 
approaching each IED as a unique threat and have applied this 
in their training.
IED RSPs do not always mirror UXO procedures. For exam-
ple, IEDD principles encourage standoff distances and devices 
such as remote control vehicles (RCV), unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAV), or hook and line kits to conduct circuit disrup-
tion from a safe area. Additionally, due to the preponderance 
of electrically initiated IEDs, water-based disruptors are often 
used to achieve neutralization. These can include improvised 
general emplaced disruptors made from water bottles and det-
onating cord. 
Why conduct an RSP versus destruction? There might be 
opportunities to dispose of an IED in situ, where bulk explo-
sives are used to cause a high order detonation of the device. 
Although this can be the safest and easiest option, destruc-
tion in situ can present problems. Common obstacles include: 
the unavailability of explosives, potential damage to the sur-
rounding area, and unclear legal authorities to conduct high 
order detonations in the host country. Destruction of an IED 
in situ can also expose an operator to a viable device for lon-
ger than necessary. For example, when dealing with a pres-
sure plate IED, if the IEDD operator intends to destroy it in 
situ, the operator needs to achieve intimate contact between 
the IED’s main charge and an explosive donor charge (unless 
Suicide IED belt found in Ramadi, Iraq.
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they have access to a shaped charge or large amount of bulk 
explosives). If the pressure plate is adjacent to or directly above 
the main charge, the operator will need to spend a consider-
able amount of time feeling for the main charge while in close 
proximity to the firing switch. The resultant explosion may 
also interfere with other IEDs in the vicinity, thus increasing 
the hazard. Therefore, even if an IED can be destroyed in situ, 
the operator might still elect to follow RSPs and disrupt the 
power source remotely or semi-remotely. 
DEFINE AND UNDERSTAND THE THREAT
The pressure plate IED (PPIED) became synonymous with 
Afghanistan. Although the Taliban also deployed vast num-
bers of devices that were self-detonated, or detonated via radio 
control or command wire, the PPIED often posed the greatest 
challenge to Coalition Forces. Although many variants were 
deployed, the general tactic was identical. The device was con-
cealed and buried in the ground with a simple electrical cir-
cuit utilizing a firing switch created via two contacts held in 
the open position by spacers. When the weight of the target is 
applied to the pressure plate, the contacts come together, the 
circuit completes, and the device detonates.
Previously in Iraq, PPIEDs were used on a small scale 
against Coalition Forces. ISIL, however, has used PPIEDs and 
other victim operated IEDs (VOIED) in vast quantities. These 
have often been emplaced in a defensive manner in order to 
restrict avenues of approach as the Iraqi Army begins their 
offensive ground operations to liberate ISIL-controlled areas. 
They often deployed PPIEDs in a manner similar to conven-
tional barrier minefields, linking natural obstacles. These 
devices, like those in Afghanistan, continue to utilize a simple 
firing circuit with a normally open switch. 
A key factor for organizations to consider during IEDD 
operations is that the batteries powering many IEDs have 
unusually long life spans. Many IEDs are designed to not 
draw any current from the IED’s power source. When com-
pared to the shorter life of a standard nine-volt battery in a 
house smoke alarm, ISIL devices may be viable for several 
years after they are emplaced. The number of IEDs that have 
functioned in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq 8–10 months 
after the area was liberated clearly demonstrates that batteries 
contain enough voltage to detonate these devices.
ISIL has taken the effectiveness of pressure plate IEDs and 
has sought to develop devices and tactics to further optimize 
VOIEDs in the urban environment. As identified in Al Anbar 
Province and other areas, ISIL made extensive use of a variety 
of IED types in homes, schools, factories, and infrastructure 
like water, power, and sewage plants. These include trip wires, 
crush switches, hydraulic switches, anti-lift triggers, and a 
variety of pull switches. The vast majority of these VOIEDs 
normally employ an open firing switch that functions as a 
result of a door being opened, an object being moved, or a per-
son walking through a doorway. This again means that there 
is no electrical draw of the power source and the device can 
stay viable for an extensive period of time.
TRAIN FOR THE THREAT
IED Search and Detect Operations. Training in open-
area, route, building, and infrastructure search and detect 
(SnD) procedures is essential to meet the challenges posed in 
UXO scrap from a single sector at Al Anbar University, Iraq.
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urban post-conflict zones. These procedures take a systematic 
approach depending on the terrain and environment while 
also assessing the intent and capability of the device user. This 
approach can vary considerably from the use of instruments 
on un-prepared surfaces to utilizing visual checks in build-
ings and on prepared surfaces. 
A key difference between SnD and manual minefield clear-
ance is the adoption of IED threat assessment into planning 
the safest and most appropriate search procedure. For exam-
ple, the crush wire switch is difficult to detect both visually 
and via search equipment. Instead, the adopted search proce-
dure should be focused on initially avoiding areas where the 
crush wire switches are likely laid. Instead, the searcher locates 
other components of the IED, such as the main charge. Once a 
searcher detects a possible device, it is marked and reported to 
an IEDD operator for an RSP or disposal.   
IED Disposal Operations. IEDD-qualified staff need to 
be conversant with both conventional ordnance and the 
full array of IEDs. As IEDs vary considerably, training must 
introduce the student to various devices instead of special-
izing in one specific device type. Detailed training in explo-
sive theory (including the use of homemade explosives), 
IEDD philosophies and principles, task scene management, 
and threat assessment and execution all need to be covered 
specific to IEDD. The current International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) do not sufficiently prepare an operator for 
the dynamic situations they will face in the field. A unique set 
of standards must be developed for IEDD.
Local personnel hired to aid and (eventually) assume the 
responsibility of IEDD in a post-conflict area must be properly 
vetted and cleared by the local government before receiving 
any IEDD training. The technical knowledge that is acquired 
through training is a restricted defense commodity, and it can 
be exploited to create IEDs. Proper vetting and monitoring of 
employees by the IEDD organization and open communica-
tion with the local authorities is vital to ensure that this tech-
nical knowledge is not given to insurgents.   
Risk Education. The need and scope for risk education is 
evolving, and it is critical that it be delivered in an effective 
and controlled manner. With vast numbers of residential, 
commercial, and critical infrastructure buildings targeted by 
groups like ISIL, risk education needs to be immediate. Large 
numbers of displaced persons are waiting for the fighting to 
end before returning to their homes. Educating the returning 
populace to access their homes safely is required as search-
ing and clearing every house in an affected area is imprac-
tical. However, this is not meant to replace IED search and 
clearance by the recognized organization. If IEDs are deemed 
highly likely or are confirmed, then the house, business, or 
area must be assigned by a coordinating body to an IEDD 
organization or local police with the capacity to implement 
SnD operations safely.
Equip to Meet the Challenge. At the conceptual level, 
IEDD operations employ similar equipment as conventional 
EOD operations. However, the equipment needed for IEDD 
operations is not only more advanced but can often be subject 
to export restrictions. Organizations must realize the limita-
tions of equipment designed to combat different threats and 
must employ disruptors that can double as dearmers, hook 
and line kits that are fit for purpose, and personal protective 
IED search operations at Al Anbar University, Iraq.
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equipment (PPE) that is sufficient for the task. Seeking alter-
nate equipment as a means of circumnavigating problems 
posed by acquiring controlled equipment is dangerously irre-
sponsible. Without the proper equipment, the risk that opera-
tors face is greatly increased. 
An equipment area that is in need of further detailed con-
sideration in the future is the use of mechanical clearance to 
include tillers, flails, ploughs, and excavators. As with mechan-
ical minefield clearance, these machines can be used to facili-
tate the rapid creation of a confirmed hazardous area, enabling 
the start of the search and clearance phase that will likely still 
need to be conducted. IEDs that were encountered in Iraq have 
typically had main charges with a net explosive weight (NEQ) 
ranging from 10 to 20 kg (22 to 44 lb). The damage that these 
charges would cause, even to armored and remotely operated 
machines, severely limits their effective use. Whereas the use 
of machinery has a place within IEDD, organizations need to 
carefully develop standard operating procedures (SOP) to uti-
lize machines effectively. 
CASE STUDY: RAMADI, IRAQ 
Janus commenced IEDD operations in Ramadi, Iraq, in 
April 2016. Janus first established an operations base and 
recruited local deminers to retrain as searchers. These per-
sonnel were trained in IED SnD as well as battlefield area 
clearance (BAC). International technical advisors with IEDD 
experience were employed to conduct training, mentoring, 
and operational EOD/IEDD tasks. The challenges initially 
faced by the project were similar to those often encountered by 
ERW eradication organizations in the post-conflict environ-
ment. These included the requirement to build relationships 
with local stakeholders and operating in an evolving situation 
with no clear tasking authority.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS IN RAMADI
Explosive hazard threats from IEDs. ISIL employed a wide 
range of both conventional ordnance and IEDs. Therefore, in 
addition to the requirement to clear significant quantities of 
Coalition and Iraqi Army UXO, the task of combatting ISIL’s 
IEDs was immense in scale and filled with many uncertainties. 
The majority of the United Nations Development Program’s 
initial priority tasks focused on searching and clearing critical 
infrastructure. Explosive hazards could range from a victim- 
operated crush-wire IED, to an improvised pipe bomb, to a 
conventional 81 mm mortar. In addition, large air-dropped 
munitions including numerous variants of 500 lb aircraft 
bombs were regularly encountered and posed a direct threat 
to the local population.
ISIL has also developed an extensive range of projected 
IEDs (from rockets and mortars to large improvised rocketed 
assisted mortars). A large portion of these are direct copies of 
conventional ordnance, incorporating cast-and-milled main 
bodies with homemade explosive fill and a detonating cord 
booster. The fuze is often an improvised copy of a military 
fuze, incorporating a plain detonator modified by the attach-
ment of a percussion cartridge often taken from a 0.22 caliber 
cartridge. All of these improvised munitions need to be han-
dled with care due to the unknown state of the explosive fill 
and functionality of any built-in safety features.
The wide range of explosive threats present in Ramadi 
reinforces the need for comprehensive training and opera-
tional approaches. Destruction of IED belts and pressure 
plates in situ is difficult due to the inability of acquiring 
adequate high order explosives. In Iraq, the only organiza-
tion that can deliberately initiate a high order explosion is 
the Iraqi Army. This scarcity of high order explosives com-
bined with the need to prevent further damage to Ramadi’s 
critical infrastructure necessitates RSPs. Each RSP is differ-
ent depending on how the device was emplaced and the indi-
vidual situation that the operator encounters. It is critical to 
ensure that the Iraqis are trained for this task as local capac-
ity is built. SnD is more complex than destroying IEDs in 
place in an open, permissive environment. They must master 
the concepts of IEDD.
FULL SND vs SURFACE BAC
Prior to deployment, Janus developed a SnD training pack-
age based around the anticipated IED threat. Once deployed, 
these were further amended to take into account the signifi-
cant number of non-pressure plate IEDs that were encoun-
tered, such as crush wire IEDs, trip wires, and anti-lift 
devices. Thus the courses developed for the students included 
basic explosive theory, device component parts, land service 
ammunition recognition, search equipment, procedures, and 
individual search drills. Additional training was also pro-
vided on BAC procedures, which proved to be a key element 
in increasing productivity when the threat of an active IED 
could be discounted. 
Combined SnD and BAC training creates a higher level of 
productivity in many cases. In one case, a large water treat-
ment plant was occupied and cleared by the Iraqi Army with 
workers returning and starting operations at the site. Non-
technical surveys and some technical surveys were conducted 
in order to ensure that a surface BAC search could be safely 
conducted to locate conventional UXO and IED component 
parts. This adaptability in operations enabled a site to be 
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completed in approximately two days when full SnD might 
take two weeks.
STOCKPILE CLEARANCE AND EXPLOSIVE  
 HAZARD SPOT TASKS
After the Iraqi Army completed their ground assault of 
Ramadi they started the process of clearing the city of some 
of the IEDs left behind by ISIL. Often these were the devices 
that were placed in roads and the most significant build-
ings, therefore representing an immediate threat to military 
operations. These devices were then placed at the side of the 
road and formed uncontrolled stockpiles. These roadside 
stockpiles represented a significant explosive hazard. When 
the local population and construction workers returned to 
Ramadi without appropriate risk education, they started to 
add items to these piles. These items required detailed IEDD/
EOD procedures to confirm that they were safe to move to a 
central demolition site (CDS) for final disposal. 
The management of the deliberate clearance of the stock-
pile needed to be coordinated with a range of local and inter-
national stakeholders in order to achieve an adequate security 
cordon, evacuation of bystanders, and demolition. These 
stockpiles often represented an explosive hazard simply by 
the unstable nature of the homemade explosives and lack of 
basic explosive safety knowledge by the individuals that left 
the ordnance. For example, an electrical power source could 
be positioned adjacent to an electrical detonator that was 
still attached to a 20 kg (44 lb) IED main charge, which if it 
had functioned, could have detonated an additional 2,000 kg 
(4,400 lb) of explosives.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
The use of IEDs by ISIL is immense and has changed the 
face of what ERW response efforts will look like in the region 
for some time. This threat shares characteristics with other 
conflicts across the world including Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, 
Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria. Acceptance of sound IEDD prin-
cipals is the cornerstone for organizations to develop effec-
tive programs. 
The environments in which organizations operate are 
also likely to continue to become less defined with f luctua-
tion in terms of stakeholders, armed groups, and the overall 
security situation. Groups such as ISIL are becoming more 
aware that after they leave an area, ERW organizations are 
deployed to clear explosive hazards. These organizations 
have become targets.
It is hard to quantify the lives saved and the utility provided 
by IEDD in square meters cleared or the number of devices 
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found. Educating the donor community about the highly spe-
cialized personnel and equipment required to meet this mod-
ern challenge effectively is an ongoing effort. We must accept 
the realities of limited funding yet still appreciate the critical 
importance that IEDD capacity brings immediately following 
a conflict. When the work and sacrifice of government militar-
ies concludes, the private sector and humanitarian actors need 
to ensure that populations can safely re-inhabit liberated cities 
and towns. Employing specifically tailored approaches to the 
unique scourge of IEDs is fundamental to the ERW commu-
nity and ultimately, the safety of civilians and operators alike. 
The asymmetrical conflicts of the 21st century no longer 
resemble the battlefields of the past. When ongoing conflicts 
end, ERW organizations will be required to clear the path for 
civilians returning to their homes. In order for these post-
conflict efforts to be successful, the ERW community must 
evolve to counter these threats. The IEDs that are left after the 
fighting ends in Iraq are testament to the modified tactics of 
the terrorist organizations. ERW organizations must adopt 
IEDD principles and practices in order for post-conflict 
recovery to occur. 
See endnotes page 66
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